Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have witnessed astonishing advancements in recent years. Despite these successes, MLLMs remain vulnerable to flase premise problems. However, existing benchmarks targeting this issue are limited in scope: they often lack fine-grained categorization, exhibit insufficient coverage, and thus fail to provide a rigorous evaluation of the ability of models to recognize false premises. To bridge this gap, we introduce a fully automated pipeline for constructing a comprehensive benchmark of false premise questions. Our method systematically categorizes the premises into three main types and thirteen subtypes according to the abilities required to identify the premises, resulting in the JBA dataset.Results show current MLLMs still struggle with false premise recognition. Building upon this benchmark, we further propose a recognition enhancement framework tailored to strengthen the robustness of MLLMs to detect false premises. Extensive experiments demonstrate that models trained with our framework achieve significant improvements in false premise recognition.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

Current open-source Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) excel at tasks such as open-vocabulary language grounding and segmentation but can suffer under false premises when queries imply the existence of something that is not actually present in the image. We observe that existing methods that fine-tune an LMM to segment images significantly degrade their ability to reliably determine ("see") if an object is present and to interact naturally with humans ("say"), a form of catastrophic forgetting. In this work, we propose a cascading and joint training approach for LMMs to solve this task, avoiding catastrophic forgetting of previous skills. Our resulting model can "see" by detecting whether objects are present in an image, "say" by telling the user if they are not, proposing alternative queries or correcting semantic errors in the query, and finally "segment" by outputting the mask of the desired objects if they exist. Additionally, we introduce a novel False Premise Correction benchmark dataset, an extension of existing RefCOCO(+/g) referring segmentation datasets (which we call FP-RefCOCO(+/g)). The results show that our method not only detects false premises up to 55% better than existing approaches, but under false premise conditions produces relative cIOU improvements of more than 31% over baselines, and produces natural language feedback judged helpful up to 67% of the time.

Sensitivity to false assumptions (or false premises) in information-seeking questions is critical for robust question-answering (QA) systems. Recent work has shown that false assumptions in naturally occurring questions pose challenges to current models, with low performance on both generative QA and simple detection tasks (Kim et al. 2023). However, the focus of existing work on naturally occurring questions leads to a gap in the analysis of model behavior on the long tail of the distribution of possible questions. To this end, we introduce Syn-(QA)^2, a set of two synthetically generated QA datasets: one generated using perturbed relations from Wikidata, and the other by perturbing HotpotQA (Yang et al. 2018). Our findings from evaluating a range of large language models are threefold: (1) false assumptions in QA are challenging, echoing the findings of prior work, (2) the binary detection task is challenging even compared to the difficulty of generative QA itself, possibly due to the linguistic structure of the problem, and (3) the detection task is more challenging with long-tail questions compared to naturally occurring questions, highlighting the utility of our synthetic datasets and generation method.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.

As millions of Muslims turn to LLMs like GPT, Claude, and DeepSeek for religious guidance, a critical question arises: Can these AI systems reliably reason about Islamic law? We introduce IslamicLegalBench, the first benchmark evaluating LLMs across seven schools of Islamic jurisprudence, with 718 instances covering 13 tasks of varying complexity. Evaluation of nine state-of-the-art models reveals major limitations: the best model achieves only 68% correctness with 21% hallucination, while several models fall below 35% correctness and exceed 55% hallucination. Few-shot prompting provides minimal gains, improving only 2 of 9 models by >1%. Moderate-complexity tasks requiring exact knowledge show the highest errors, whereas high-complexity tasks display apparent competence through semantic reasoning. False premise detection indicates risky sycophancy, with 6 of 9 models accepting misleading assumptions at rates above 40%. These results highlight that prompt-based methods cannot compensate for missing foundational knowledge. IslamicLegalBench offers the first systematic framework to evaluate Islamic legal reasoning in AI, revealing critical gaps in tools increasingly relied on for spiritual guidance.

Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong performance on a range of robotic tasks. These models rely on multimodal inputs, with language instructions playing a crucial role -- not only in predicting actions, but also in robustly interpreting user intent, even when the requests are impossible to fulfill. In this work, we investigate how VLAs can recognize, interpret, and respond to false-premise instructions: natural language commands that reference objects or conditions absent from the environment. We propose Instruct-Verify-and-Act (IVA), a unified framework that (i) detects when an instruction cannot be executed due to a false premise, (ii) engages in language-based clarification or correction, and (iii) grounds plausible alternatives in perception and action. Towards this end, we construct a large-scale instruction tuning setup with structured language prompts and train a VLA model capable of handling both accurate and erroneous requests. Our approach leverages a contextually augmented, semi-synthetic dataset containing paired positive and false-premise instructions, enabling robust detection and natural language correction. Our experiments show that IVA improves false premise detection accuracy by 97.56% over baselines, while increasing successful responses in false-premise scenarios by 50.78%.

AI chatbots are rapidly shaping how people encounter the news, yet no prior study has systematically measured how accurately these systems, with their proprietary search integrations and retrieval-synthesis pipelines, handle emerging facts across languages and regions. We present a 14-day (February 9-22, 2026) evaluation of six AI chatbots (Gemini 3 Flash and Pro, Grok 4, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, GPT-5 and GPT-4o mini) on 2,100 factual questions derived from same-day BBC News reporting across six regional services (US & Canada, Arabic, Afrique, Hindi, Russian, Turkish). The best systems achieve over 90% multiple-choice accuracy on questions about events reported hours earlier. The same systems, however, lose 11-13% under free-response evaluation, and 16-17% across the cohort. We further characterize three failure patterns. First, every model achieves its lowest accuracy on Hindi (79% vs. 89-91% elsewhere) and citations indicate an Anglophone retrieval bias (e.g., models answering Hindi queries cite English Wikipedia more than any Hindi outlet). Second, retrieval, not reasoning, failures drive over 70% of all errors. When models retrieve a correct source, they often extract the correct answer; the problem is to land on the right source in the first place. Third, models achieving 88-96% accuracy on well-formed questions drop to 19-70% when questions contain subtle false premises, with the most vulnerable model accepting fabricated facts 64% of the time. We also identify a detection-accuracy paradox: the best false-premise detector ranks second in adversarial accuracy (abstention rate), while a weaker detector ranks first, showing that premise detection and answer recovery are partially independent capabilities. Overall, these suggest that high accuracy can mask systematic regional inequity, near-total dependence on retrieval infrastructure, and vulnerability to imperfect queries real users pose.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has become integral to large language models (LLMs), particularly for conversational AI systems where user questions may reference knowledge beyond the LLMs' training cutoff. However, many natural user questions lack well-defined answers, either due to limited domain knowledge or because the retrieval system returns documents that are relevant in appearance but uninformative in content. In such cases, LLMs often produce hallucinated answers without flagging them. While recent work has largely focused on questions with false premises, we study out-of-scope questions, where the retrieved document appears semantically similar to the question but lacks the necessary information to answer it. In this paper, we propose a guided hallucination-based approach ELOQ to automatically generate a diverse set of out-of-scope questions from post-cutoff documents, followed by human verification to ensure quality. We use this dataset to evaluate several LLMs on their ability to detect out-of-scope questions and generate appropriate responses. Finally, we introduce an improved detection method that enhances the reliability of LLM-based question-answering systems in handling out-of-scope questions.

We introduce RAM, an innovative RAG-based framework with an ever-improving memory. Inspired by humans' pedagogical process, RAM utilizes recursively reasoning-based retrieval and experience reflections to continually update the memory and learn from users' communicative feedback, namely communicative learning. Extensive experiments with both simulated and real users demonstrate significant improvements over traditional RAG and self-knowledge methods, particularly excelling in handling false premise and multi-hop questions. Furthermore, RAM exhibits promising adaptability to various feedback and retrieval method chain types, showcasing its potential for advancing AI capabilities in dynamic knowledge acquisition and lifelong learning.

Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade. We report two controlled experiments crossing all three factors on one held, contamination-free synthetic corpus (the "Book of Veyra," 8,780 uniquely-named entities, deterministically regenerable from a fixed seed), evaluated across five models. Experiment 1 (960 calls/model) measures instruction-following decay as rule count N grows from 10 to 160, crossed with four formats and system-prompt vs. user-turn placement. Perfect-response rate collapses to zero by N=80 for every model, format, and placement. Placement produces effects at least as large as format at N=160 in most models, but the direction is model-specific. No model shows a reliable markdown advantage; one 35B model favors plain text instead. Experiment 2 (5,520 calls/model) measures recall accuracy, false-premise sycophancy, and absent-fact fabrication across a 2k-to-512k-token context ladder in the same four formats. Recall stays near ceiling through 64-128k tokens, then degrades sharply and format-dependently: one model's accuracy spread reaches 48 points at 128k tokens. Fabrication never occurs (0/5,760 probes), and sycophancy stays negligible (<=8.3%). What rises sharply near each model's context ceiling is outright refusal to answer (0% to 79-90%), distinct from sycophancy or fabrication. Neither pre-registered format ordering holds, and token overhead (+22% to +37% over plain text) further changes which format is preferable where accuracy spread is genuine. We release the full harness, corpus generator, and raw results (VeyraBench): https://github.com/iNetanel/veyrabench

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

Hallucination remains a critical challenge for developing trustworthy Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). While existing benchmarks mainly focus on entity, attribute, and relation hallucinations, knowledge-related failures are often investigated separately, lacking a unified evaluation framework across different hallucination dimensions. To overcome this, we propose KnowHal, a benchmark that explicitly incorporates knowledge hallucination into multimodal hallucination evaluation spanning four dimensions: entity, attribute, relation, and knowledge. KnowHal constructs paired positive and negative questions over shared images and entities, enabling controlled comparisons among perceptual errors, knowledge-related errors, and false-premise acceptance. The benchmark contains 1,800 samples across 10 domains and 50 categories, constructed through a semi-automated pipeline combining LLM assistance, CLIP-based filtering, and human verification. We evaluate 14 representative MLLMs on KnowHal and conduct extensive analyses. Results show that the knowledge dimension consistently presents the greatest challenge for nearly all evaluated models, while most models exhibit substantial performance degradation on negative questions, revealing limited robustness to false premises. By unifying four hallucination dimensions with paired question design, KnowHal addresses an important gap in existing evaluation frameworks and enables a more comprehensive assessment of hallucinations in MLLMs.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are expected to respond helpfully to appropriate requests while withholding compliance with requests that are incorrect, unsafe, infeasible, or unanswerable. However, existing benchmarks predominantly evaluate non-compliance at the level of the query as a whole, assuming that each request either warrants compliance or requires withholding compliance. In practice, real-world queries can contain a mixture of answerable content and components for which compliance should be withheld. In this paper, we introduce KoNA, a benchmark for evaluating selective non-compliance in VLMs across five categories: False Premise, Visual Inaccessibility, Universal Unknown, Task Feasibility, and Safety. Each task evaluates two capabilities: query-level non-compliance and component-level non-compliance under paired single and compound queries. Our evaluation across diverse VLMs shows that models often fail to refuse, correct, or abstain appropriately, and these failures become more pronounced when queries require selective non-compliance. To address this challenge, we fine-tune VLMs using KoNA examples that require selective non-compliance, together with a fully answerable set that should receive direct answers. Our fine-tuned models achieve substantial improvements in non-compliance accuracy while largely maintaining performance on fully answerable tasks. These results suggest that the fine-tuned models can distinguish between answerable components and those requiring non-compliance and respond in a task-appropriate manner.

When an omnimodal large language model accepts a question whose textual premise contradicts what it actually sees or hears, does the failure lie in perception or in action? Recent omnimodal models are positioned as perception-grounded agents that jointly process video, audio, and text, yet a basic form of grounding remains untested: catching a textual claim that conflicts with the model's own sensory input. We introduce IMAVB, a curated 500-clip benchmark of long-form movies with a 2x2 design crossing target modality (vision, audio) and premise condition (standard, misleading), which lets us measure conflict detection separately from ordinary multimodal comprehension. Across eight open-source omnimodal LLMs and Gemini 3.1 Pro, we document a Representation-Action Gap: hidden states reliably encode premise-perception mismatches even when the same models almost never reject the false claim in their outputs. Behaviorally, models fall into two failure modes: under-rejection, in which they answer misleading questions as if the false premise were true; and over-rejection, in which they reject more often but also reject standard questions, sacrificing ordinary comprehension accuracy. The gap is modality-asymmetric (audio grounding underperforms vision) and prompt-resistant across seven variants. As an initial diagnostic intervention, a probe-guided logit adjustment (PGLA) re-injects the encoded mismatch signal into decoding and consistently improves rejection behavior. Together, these results suggest the bottleneck for omnimodal grounding lies in translation, not perception.

Most large language models (LLMs) are trained once and never updated; thus, they lack the ability to dynamically adapt to our ever-changing world. In this work, we perform a detailed study of the factuality of LLM-generated text in the context of answering questions that test current world knowledge. Specifically, we introduce FreshQA, a novel dynamic QA benchmark encompassing a diverse range of question and answer types, including questions that require fast-changing world knowledge as well as questions with false premises that need to be debunked. We benchmark a diverse array of both closed and open-source LLMs under a two-mode evaluation procedure that allows us to measure both correctness and hallucination. Through human evaluations involving more than 50K judgments, we shed light on limitations of these models and demonstrate significant room for improvement: for instance, all models (regardless of model size) struggle on questions that involve fast-changing knowledge and false premises. Motivated by these results, we present FreshPrompt, a simple few-shot prompting method that substantially boosts the performance of an LLM on FreshQA by incorporating relevant and up-to-date information retrieved from a search engine into the prompt. Our experiments show that FreshPrompt outperforms both competing search engine-augmented prompting methods such as Self-Ask (Press et al., 2022) as well as commercial systems such as Perplexity.AI. Further analysis of FreshPrompt reveals that both the number of retrieved evidences and their order play a key role in influencing the correctness of LLM-generated answers. Additionally, instructing the LLM to generate concise and direct answers helps reduce hallucination compared to encouraging more verbose answers. To facilitate future work, we release FreshQA at github.com/freshllms/freshqa and commit to updating it at regular intervals.

Hallucination has been a major problem for large language models and remains a critical challenge when it comes to multimodality in which vision-language models (VLMs) have to deal with not just textual but also visual inputs. Despite rapid progress in VLMs, resources for evaluating and addressing multimodal hallucination are limited and mostly focused on evaluation. This work introduces HaloQuest, a novel visual question answering dataset that captures various aspects of multimodal hallucination such as false premises, insufficient contexts, and visual challenges. A novel idea from HaloQuest is to leverage synthetic images, apart from real ones, to enable dataset creation at scale. With over 7.7K examples spanning across a wide variety of categories, HaloQuest was designed to be both a challenging benchmark for VLMs and a fine-tuning dataset for advancing multimodal reasoning. Our experiments reveal that current models struggle with HaloQuest, with all open-source VLMs achieving below 36% accuracy. On the other hand, fine-tuning on HaloQuest significantly reduces hallucination rates while preserving performance on standard reasoning tasks. Our results discover that benchmarking with generated images is highly correlated (r=0.97) with real images. Last but not least, we propose a novel Auto-Eval mechanism that is highly correlated with human raters (r=0.99) for evaluating VLMs. In sum, this work makes concrete strides towards understanding, evaluating, and mitigating hallucination in VLMs, serving as an important step towards more reliable multimodal AI systems in the future.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in diverse scenarios, the extent to which they could tacitly spread misinformation emerges as a critical safety concern. Current research primarily evaluates LLMs on explicit false statements, overlooking how misinformation often manifests subtly as unchallenged premises in real-world user interactions. We curated ECHOMIST, the first comprehensive benchmark for implicit misinformation, where the misinformed assumptions are embedded in a user query to LLMs. ECHOMIST is based on rigorous selection criteria and carefully curated data from diverse sources, including real-world human-AI conversations and social media interactions. We also introduce a new evaluation metric to measure whether LLMs can recognize and counter false information rather than amplify users' misconceptions. Through an extensive empirical study on a wide range of LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude, and Llama, we find that current models perform alarmingly poorly on this task, often failing to detect false premises and generating misleading explanations. Our findings underscore the critical need for an increased focus on implicit misinformation in LLM safety research.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems predominantly rely on semantic relevance as a proxy for utility. However, this assumption collapses in realistic decision-making scenarios where user queries are laden with cognitive biases, such as false premises or confirmation bias. In such cases, maximizing relevance paradoxically promotes the retrieval of sycophantic evidence that reinforces hallucinations, a critical failure we term the ``Relevance-Robustness Gap''. To bridge this gap, we propose CoRM-RAG (Counterfactual Risk Minimization for RAG), a framework that aligns retrieval with decision safety rather than mere similarity. Grounded in causal intervention, we introduce a Cognitive Perturbation Protocol to simulate user biases during training, which is then distilled into a lightweight Evidence Critic. This scoring module learns to identify documents that possess sufficient evidential strength to steer the model toward correctness despite adversarial query perturbations. Extensive experiments on decision-making benchmarks demonstrate that CoRM-RAG significantly outperforms strong dense retrievers and LLM-based rerankers in adversarial settings, while enabling effective risk-aware abstention through reliable robustness scoring. Our code is available at https://github.com/PeiYangLiu/CoRM-RAG.git.

Large language models (LLMs) often respond even when prompts omit critical details or include misleading information, leading to hallucinations or reinforced misconceptions. We study how to evaluate and improve LLMs' ability to decide when and what to ask for clarification without sacrificing task performance. We introduce AskBench, an interactive benchmark that converts standard QA pairs into multi-turn interactions with explicit checkpoints. A unified judge loop evaluates final answers and simulates user responses as needed. AskBench covers two settings: AskMind, with intent-deficient queries requiring clarification, and AskOverconfidence, with queries containing false premises that must be identified and corrected. We further propose rubric-guided reinforcement learning with verifier-based rewards (RLVR), which uses structured rubrics to encourage targeted clarification. Experiments show consistent improvements in accuracy, rubric adherence, and interaction efficiency, with strong generalization to unseen domains.

We present UGround, a Unified visual Grounding paradigm that dynamically selects intermediate layers across Unrolled transformers as ``mask as prompt'', diverging from the prevailing pipeline that leverages the fixed last hidden layer as ``<SEG> as prompt''. UGround addresses two primary challenges posed by the prevailing paradigm: (1) its reliance on the fixed last hidden layer, which sequentially amplifies cumulative errors arising from layer-by-layer propagation without intermediate correction, and (2) its use of <SEG> as a prompt, which implicitly projects textual embeddings into visual space without explicit spatial cues (\eg, coordinates). Central to UGround is Policy-Prompted Masking, which comprises two key components: Stochastic Skip Connection (SSC) and Mask as Prompt (MasP). SSC is a reinforcement learning policy that, via stochastic sampling, allows each <SEG> token to slide across unrolled transformer layers, enabling dynamic layer selection at which it connects to the vision model (\eg, SAM) in a skip-connection fashion. Given the selected hidden layer, MasP uses the similarity map derived from the <SEG> token and image tokens as a soft logit mask to prompt SAM for mask generation, offering explicit spatial cues through its activation regions. To validate the effectiveness of UGround, we, for the first time, have unified visual grounding within a single framework from an attribute perspective, spanning from traditional refer expression segmentation to newly proposed reasoning segmentation, single-target to multi-target, positive query to false premise (empty target). All codes and models are publicly available at https://github.com/rui-qian/UGround{https://github.com/rui-qian/UGround}.

Vision-language process reward models (VL-PRMs) are increasingly used to score intermediate reasoning steps and rerank candidates under test-time scaling. However, they often function as black-box judges: a low step score may reflect a genuine reasoning mistake or simply the verifier's misperception of the image. This entanglement between perception and reasoning leads to systematic false positives (rewarding hallucinated visual premises) and false negatives (penalizing correct grounded statements), undermining both reranking and error localization. We introduce Explicit Visual Premise Verification (EVPV), a lightweight verification interface that conditions step scoring on the reliability of the visual premises a step depends on. The policy is prompted to produce a step-wise visual checklist that makes required visual facts explicit, while a constraint extractor independently derives structured visual constraints from the input image. EVPV matches checklist claims against these constraints to compute a scalar visual reliability signal, and calibrates PRM step rewards via reliability gating: rewards for visually dependent steps are attenuated when reliability is low and preserved when reliability is high. This decouples perceptual uncertainty from logical evaluation without per-step tool calls. Experiments on VisualProcessBench and six multimodal reasoning benchmarks show that EVPV improves step-level verification and consistently boosts Best-of-N reranking accuracy over strong baselines. Furthermore, injecting controlled corruption into the extracted constraints produces monotonic performance degradation, providing causal evidence that the gains arise from constraint fidelity and explicit premise verification rather than incidental prompt effects. Code is available at: https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/EVPV-PRM

In many social-science research tasks, such as economics, LLM-based agents must produce outputs for which no cheap, task-complete, machine-readable correctness signal exists. This creates a distinctive reliability problem for multi-agent systems: how should generation, critique, coordination, and human judgment be organized when no component can certify the final result? We address this problem through pAI-Econ-claude, a gated, human-in-the-loop multi-agent architecture for AI-assisted economic theory development. Agents coordinate through a shared workspace of inspectable intermediate records; specialized gates diagnose targeted failure modes and recommend loopbacks without certifying correctness; and human checkpoints retain authority over decisions that are costly to reverse. We evaluate the architecture on five matched economic-theory tasks against an ungated baseline. Two evaluators blinded to configuration agreed on all five pairwise rankings, preferring the gated architecture in four tasks and the baseline in one. Mean failure severity fell from 1.58 to 1.16, while overall usefulness rose from 2.60 to 3.10. The largest observed gain occurred when a reality check rejected a false market-structure premise and a proof review prompted revision of a false welfare claim. The negative case shows that scaffolding can also compress an economically important mechanism too aggressively. The results support a bounded claim: gated oversight improves the auditability of AI-assisted economic theory without substituting for formal verification, and the allocation of irreversible human judgment is a more informative design variable than pure agent autonomy. The workflow is publicly available at https://github.com/maxwell2732/pAI-Econ-claude.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

With the growing importance of detecting misinformation, many studies have focused on verifying factual claims by retrieving evidence. However, canonical fact verification tasks do not apply to catching subtle differences in factually consistent claims, which might still bias the readers, especially on contentious political or economic issues. Our underlying assumption is that among the trusted sources, one's argument is not necessarily more true than the other, requiring comparison rather than verification. In this study, we propose ClaimDiff, a novel dataset that primarily focuses on comparing the nuance between claim pairs. In ClaimDiff, we provide 2,941 annotated claim pairs from 268 news articles. We observe that while humans are capable of detecting the nuances between claims, strong baselines struggle to detect them, showing over a 19% absolute gap with the humans. We hope this initial study could help readers to gain an unbiased grasp of contentious issues through machine-aided comparison.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Peer review serves as a backbone of academic research, but in most AI conferences, the review quality is degrading as the number of submissions explodes. To reliably detect low-quality reviews, we define misinformed review points as either "weaknesses" in a review that contain incorrect premises, or "questions" in a review that can be already answered by the paper. We verify that 15.2% of weaknesses and 26.4% of questions are misinformed and introduce ReviewScore indicating if a review point is misinformed. To evaluate the factuality of each premise of weaknesses, we propose an automated engine that reconstructs every explicit and implicit premise from a weakness. We build a human expert-annotated ReviewScore dataset to check the ability of LLMs to automate ReviewScore evaluation. Then, we measure human-model agreements on ReviewScore using eight current state-of-the-art LLMs and verify moderate agreements. We also prove that evaluating premise-level factuality shows significantly higher agreements than evaluating weakness-level factuality. A thorough disagreement analysis further supports a potential of fully automated ReviewScore evaluation.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

An emerging method to cheaply improve a weaker language model is to finetune it on outputs from a stronger model, such as a proprietary system like ChatGPT (e.g., Alpaca, Self-Instruct, and others). This approach looks to cheaply imitate the proprietary model's capabilities using a weaker open-source model. In this work, we critically analyze this approach. We first finetune a series of LMs that imitate ChatGPT using varying base model sizes (1.5B--13B), data sources, and imitation data amounts (0.3M--150M tokens). We then evaluate the models using crowd raters and canonical NLP benchmarks. Initially, we were surprised by the output quality of our imitation models -- they appear far better at following instructions, and crowd workers rate their outputs as competitive with ChatGPT. However, when conducting more targeted automatic evaluations, we find that imitation models close little to none of the gap from the base LM to ChatGPT on tasks that are not heavily supported in the imitation data. We show that these performance discrepancies may slip past human raters because imitation models are adept at mimicking ChatGPT's style but not its factuality. Overall, we conclude that model imitation is a false promise: there exists a substantial capabilities gap between open and closed LMs that, with current methods, can only be bridged using an unwieldy amount of imitation data or by using more capable base LMs. In turn, we argue that the highest leverage action for improving open-source models is to tackle the difficult challenge of developing better base LMs, rather than taking the shortcut of imitating proprietary systems.

Generative AI models often learn and reproduce false information present in their training corpora. This position paper argues that, analogous to biological immunization, where controlled exposure to a weakened pathogen builds immunity, AI models should be fine tuned on small, quarantined sets of explicitly labeled falsehoods as a "vaccine" against misinformation. These curated false examples are periodically injected during finetuning, strengthening the model ability to recognize and reject misleading claims while preserving accuracy on truthful inputs. An illustrative case study shows that immunized models generate substantially less misinformation than baselines. To our knowledge, this is the first training framework that treats fact checked falsehoods themselves as a supervised vaccine, rather than relying on input perturbations or generic human feedback signals, to harden models against future misinformation. We also outline ethical safeguards and governance controls to ensure the safe use of false data. Model immunization offers a proactive paradigm for aligning AI systems with factuality.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical domains like healthcare, justice, and social services has sparked numerous regulatory initiatives aimed at ensuring their safe deployment. Current regulatory frameworks, exemplified by recent US and EU efforts, primarily focus on procedural guidelines while presuming that scientific benchmarking can effectively validate AI safety, similar to how crash tests verify vehicle safety or clinical trials validate drug efficacy. However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the unique technical challenges posed by modern AI systems. Through systematic analysis of successful technology regulation case studies, we demonstrate that effective scientific regulation requires a causal theory linking observable test outcomes to future performance - for instance, how a vehicle's crash resistance at one speed predicts its safety at lower speeds. We show that deep learning models, which learn complex statistical patterns from training data without explicit causal mechanisms, preclude such guarantees. This limitation renders traditional regulatory approaches inadequate for ensuring AI safety. Moving forward, we call for regulators to reckon with this limitation, and propose a preliminary two-tiered regulatory framework that acknowledges these constraints: mandating human oversight for high-risk applications while developing appropriate risk communication strategies for lower-risk uses. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider fundamental assumptions in AI regulation and suggest a concrete path forward for policymakers and researchers.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based applications are graduating from research prototypes to products serving millions of users, influencing how people write and consume information. A prominent example is the appearance of Answer Engines: LLM-based generative search engines supplanting traditional search engines. Answer engines not only retrieve relevant sources to a user query but synthesize answer summaries that cite the sources. To understand these systems' limitations, we first conducted a study with 21 participants, evaluating interactions with answer vs. traditional search engines and identifying 16 answer engine limitations. From these insights, we propose 16 answer engine design recommendations, linked to 8 metrics. An automated evaluation implementing our metrics on three popular engines (You.com, Perplexity.ai, BingChat) quantifies common limitations (e.g., frequent hallucination, inaccurate citation) and unique features (e.g., variation in answer confidence), with results mirroring user study insights. We release our Answer Engine Evaluation benchmark (AEE) to facilitate transparent evaluation of LLM-based applications.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Media is full of false claims. Even Oxford Dictionaries named "post-truth" as the word of 2016. This makes it more important than ever to build systems that can identify the veracity of a story, and the kind of discourse there is around it. RumourEval is a SemEval shared task that aims to identify and handle rumours and reactions to them, in text. We present an annotation scheme, a large dataset covering multiple topics - each having their own families of claims and replies - and use these to pose two concrete challenges as well as the results achieved by participants on these challenges.

Researchers have argued that large language models (LLMs) exhibit high-quality writing capabilities from blogs to stories. However, evaluating objectively the creativity of a piece of writing is challenging. Inspired by the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT), which measures creativity as a process, we use the Consensual Assessment Technique [3] and propose the Torrance Test of Creative Writing (TTCW) to evaluate creativity as a product. TTCW consists of 14 binary tests organized into the original dimensions of Fluency, Flexibility, Originality, and Elaboration. We recruit 10 creative writers and implement a human assessment of 48 stories written either by professional authors or LLMs using TTCW. Our analysis shows that LLM-generated stories pass 3-10X less TTCW tests than stories written by professionals. In addition, we explore the use of LLMs as assessors to automate the TTCW evaluation, revealing that none of the LLMs positively correlate with the expert assessments.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

False-presupposition QA (FPQA) tests LLMs on their ability to identify false presuppositions in questions and abstain or correct them rather than reinforcing false assumptions. The common approach reduces the task to prompting LLMs to extract presuppositions and fact checking each presupposition. While the performance on dedicated benchmarks keeps improving, evaluation largely focuses on questions with false presuppositions (FPQs) while ignoring the performance on ``normal'' questions (TPQs). Since many benchmarks over-represent FPQs compared to their natural occurrence, the result is that performance on these benchmarks doesn't reflect real-world QA performance. Through extensive experiments across various model families, sizes, and benchmarks, we show that methods that perform better on FPQs tend to perform worse on TPQs. Our analysis reveals this is the result of weak fact checking modules that reject also true presuppositions. We hope our findings will help guide future work toward FPQA methods that generalize well to realistic settings.

As corporations rush to integrate large language models (LLMs) to their search offerings, it is critical that they provide factually accurate information that is robust to any presuppositions that a user may express. In this work, we introduce UPHILL, a dataset consisting of health-related queries with varying degrees of presuppositions. Using UPHILL, we evaluate the factual accuracy and consistency of InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and BingChat models. We find that while model responses rarely disagree with true health claims (posed as questions), they often fail to challenge false claims: responses from InstructGPT agree with 32% of the false claims, ChatGPT 26% and BingChat 23%. As we increase the extent of presupposition in input queries, the responses from InstructGPT and ChatGPT agree with the claim considerably more often, regardless of its veracity. Responses from BingChat, which rely on retrieved webpages, are not as susceptible. Given the moderate factual accuracy, and the inability of models to consistently correct false assumptions, our work calls for a careful assessment of current LLMs for use in high-stakes scenarios.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

This study evaluates the effect of counterfactual explanations on the interpretation of chest X-rays. We conduct a reader study with two radiologists assessing 240 chest X-ray predictions to rate their confidence that the model's prediction is correct using a 5 point scale. Half of the predictions are false positives. Each prediction is explained twice, once using traditional attribution methods and once with a counterfactual explanation. The overall results indicate that counterfactual explanations allow a radiologist to have more confidence in true positive predictions compared to traditional approaches (0.15pm0.95 with p=0.01) with only a small increase in false positive predictions (0.04pm1.06 with p=0.57). We observe the specific prediction tasks of Mass and Atelectasis appear to benefit the most compared to other tasks.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

The rapid propagation of misinformation poses substantial risks to public interest. To combat misinformation, large language models (LLMs) are adapted to automatically verify claim credibility. Nevertheless, existing methods heavily rely on the embedded knowledge within LLMs and / or black-box APIs for evidence collection, leading to subpar performance with smaller LLMs or upon unreliable context. In this paper, we propose retrieval augmented fact verification through the synthesis of contrasting arguments (RAFTS). Upon input claims, RAFTS starts with evidence retrieval, where we design a retrieval pipeline to collect and re-rank relevant documents from verifiable sources. Then, RAFTS forms contrastive arguments (i.e., supporting or refuting) conditioned on the retrieved evidence. In addition, RAFTS leverages an embedding model to identify informative demonstrations, followed by in-context prompting to generate the prediction and explanation. Our method effectively retrieves relevant documents as evidence and evaluates arguments from varying perspectives, incorporating nuanced information for fine-grained decision-making. Combined with informative in-context examples as prior, RAFTS achieves significant improvements to supervised and LLM baselines without complex prompts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method through extensive experiments, where RAFTS can outperform GPT-based methods with a significantly smaller 7B LLM.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Much of the research quantifying volume and spread of online misinformation measures the construct at the source level, identifying a set of specific unreliable domains that account for a relatively small share of news consumption. This source-level dichotomy obscures the potential for users to repurpose factually true information from reliable sources to advance misleading narratives. We demonstrate this potentially far more prevalent form of misinformation by identifying articles from reliable sources that are frequently co-shared with (shared by users who also shared) "fake" news on social media, and concurrently extracting narratives present in fake news content and claims fact-checked as false. Specifically in this study, we use Twitter/X data from May 2018 to November 2021 matched to a U.S. voter file. We find that narratives present in misinformation content are significantly more likely to occur in co-shared articles than in articles from the same reliable sources that are not co-shared, consistent with users using information from mainstream sources to enhance the credibility and reach of potentially misleading claims.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

In 2023, a New York judge sanctioned two attorneys in Mata v. Avianca for filing a brief with hallucinated citations generated by ChatGPT. Such failures are largely caught by database lookups; the harder problem is detecting citations that point to real cases but do not support the propositions for which they are offered -- a failure mode that existing evaluations of LLMs for legal use cases largely overlook. In this paper, we study proposition-level citation support verification through controlled perturbations of real legal citations obtained from two legal corpora, either replacing the cited case or changing only the pinpoint page within the same case. We evaluate fourteen model configurations on the resulting examples. Models catch 93-100% of wrong-case corruptions. They catch only 37-61% of wrong-pinpoint corruptions on court opinions and 52-83% on legal briefs. When models fail to catch wrong-pinpoint corruptions, they accept the citation based on topical overlap rather than page-level support. Scale and extended reasoning narrow the gap but do not close it: GPT-5.4 with high reasoning effort still misses 40% of pinpoint mismatches on court opinions and 18% on briefs. Prompting the model to verify support at the cited page improves recall, but it also raises the false positive rate. Recognizing the right legal topic and verifying support for the cited proposition are distinct capabilities, and current models conflate them.

We examine how well the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models used in legal reasoning support abductive reasoning tasks. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference in which a hypothesis is formulated from a set of observations, and that hypothesis is used to explain the observations. The ability to formulate such hypotheses is important for lawyers and legal scholars as it helps them articulate logical arguments, interpret laws, and develop legal theories. Our motivation is to consider the belief that deep learning models, especially large language models (LLMs), will soon replace lawyers because they perform well on tasks related to legal text processing. But to do so, we believe, requires some form of abductive hypothesis formation. In other words, while LLMs become more popular and powerful, we want to investigate their capacity for abductive reasoning. To pursue this goal, we start by building a logic-augmented dataset for abductive reasoning with 498,697 samples and then use it to evaluate the performance of a SOTA model in the legal field. Our experimental results show that although these models can perform well on tasks related to some aspects of legal text processing, they still fall short in supporting abductive reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant potential in scientific disciplines such as biomedicine, particularly in hypothesis generation, where they can analyze vast literature, identify patterns, and suggest research directions. However, a key challenge lies in evaluating the truthfulness of generated hypotheses, as verifying their accuracy often requires substantial time and resources. Additionally, the hallucination problem in LLMs can lead to the generation of hypotheses that appear plausible but are ultimately incorrect, undermining their reliability. To facilitate the systematic study of these challenges, we introduce TruthHypo, a benchmark for assessing the capabilities of LLMs in generating truthful biomedical hypotheses, and KnowHD, a knowledge-based hallucination detector to evaluate how well hypotheses are grounded in existing knowledge. Our results show that LLMs struggle to generate truthful hypotheses. By analyzing hallucinations in reasoning steps, we demonstrate that the groundedness scores provided by KnowHD serve as an effective metric for filtering truthful hypotheses from the diverse outputs of LLMs. Human evaluations further validate the utility of KnowHD in identifying truthful hypotheses and accelerating scientific discovery. Our data and source code are available at https://github.com/Teddy-XiongGZ/TruthHypo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

Search-augmented LLMs increasingly mediate everyday consumer recommendations by retrieving live web content. This creates a new risk: LLM recommenders may consume web content that Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) operators have polluted to mislead them. We ask: to what extent do they become unwitting promoters of fake products? We introduce FORGE (Fake Online Recommendations in Generative Environments), which locally rewrites real products in a frozen set of retrieved web pages into fake ones and measures how often the LLM recommends the fake product, across 225 real products in 15 categories and 5 consumer scenarios. Across 12 commercial and open-weights LLMs, all models are vulnerable: a single polluted page yields fooled rates of up to 27%, while the full top-3 replacement raises this to 73.8%. Vulnerability varies across categories, increasing when models lack stable prior knowledge of the products. Reasoning does not mitigate this vulnerability; instead, it often generates spurious social proof to justify false recommendations. None of the four defenses is adequate: the skepticism prompt can exacerbate vulnerability much like reasoning, the two consensus filters risk suppressing legitimate products, and credibility re-ranking helps every model but removes only a sixth of the fakes. We release the FORGE benchmark and the evaluation code at https://github.com/leoluolol/forge-benchmark.

Verifying complex political claims is a challenging task, especially when politicians use various tactics to subtly misrepresent the facts. Automatic fact-checking systems fall short here, and their predictions like "half-true" are not very useful in isolation, since we have no idea which parts of the claim are true and which are not. In this work, we focus on decomposing a complex claim into a comprehensive set of yes-no subquestions whose answers influence the veracity of the claim. We present ClaimDecomp, a dataset of decompositions for over 1000 claims. Given a claim and its verification paragraph written by fact-checkers, our trained annotators write subquestions covering both explicit propositions of the original claim and its implicit facets, such as asking about additional political context that changes our view of the claim's veracity. We study whether state-of-the-art models can generate such subquestions, showing that these models generate reasonable questions to ask, but predicting the comprehensive set of subquestions from the original claim without evidence remains challenging. We further show that these subquestions can help identify relevant evidence to fact-check the full claim and derive the veracity through their answers, suggesting that they can be useful pieces of a fact-checking pipeline.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Large-scale datasets for natural language inference are created by presenting crowd workers with a sentence (premise), and asking them to generate three new sentences (hypotheses) that it entails, contradicts, or is logically neutral with respect to. We show that, in a significant portion of such data, this protocol leaves clues that make it possible to identify the label by looking only at the hypothesis, without observing the premise. Specifically, we show that a simple text categorization model can correctly classify the hypothesis alone in about 67% of SNLI (Bowman et. al, 2015) and 53% of MultiNLI (Williams et. al, 2017). Our analysis reveals that specific linguistic phenomena such as negation and vagueness are highly correlated with certain inference classes. Our findings suggest that the success of natural language inference models to date has been overestimated, and that the task remains a hard open problem.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Misinformation regarding climate change is a key roadblock in addressing one of the most serious threats to humanity. This paper investigates factual accuracy in large language models (LLMs) regarding climate information. Using true/false labeled Q&A data for fine-tuning and evaluating LLMs on climate-related claims, we compare open-source models, assessing their ability to generate truthful responses to climate change questions. We investigate the detectability of models intentionally poisoned with false climate information, finding that such poisoning may not affect the accuracy of a model's responses in other domains. Furthermore, we compare the effectiveness of unlearning algorithms, fine-tuning, and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) for factually grounding LLMs on climate change topics. Our evaluation reveals that unlearning algorithms can be effective for nuanced conceptual claims, despite previous findings suggesting their inefficacy in privacy contexts. These insights aim to guide the development of more factually reliable LLMs and highlight the need for additional work to secure LLMs against misinformation attacks.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Fact verification systems typically assess whether a claim is supported by retrieved evidence, assuming that truthfulness depends solely on what is stated. However, many real-world claims are half-truths, factually correct yet misleading due to the omission of critical context. Existing models struggle with such cases, as they are not designed to reason about what is left unsaid. We introduce the task of half-truth detection, and propose PolitiFact-Hidden, a new benchmark with 15k political claims annotated with sentence-level evidence alignment and inferred claim intent. To address this challenge, we present TRACER, a modular re-assessment framework that identifies omission-based misinformation by aligning evidence, inferring implied intent, and estimating the causal impact of hidden content. TRACER can be integrated into existing fact-checking pipelines and consistently improves performance across multiple strong baselines. Notably, it boosts Half-True classification F1 by up to 16 points, highlighting the importance of modeling omissions for trustworthy fact verification.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

The spread of misinformation is a prominent problem in today's society, and many researchers in academia and industry are trying to combat it. Due to the vast amount of misinformation that is created every day, it is unrealistic to leave this task to human fact-checkers. Data scientists and researchers have been working on automated misinformation detection for years, and it is still a challenging problem today. The goal of our research is to add a new level to automated misinformation detection; classifying segments of text with persuasive writing techniques in order to produce interpretable reasoning for why an article can be marked as misinformation. To accomplish this, we present a novel annotation scheme containing many common persuasive writing tactics, along with a dataset with human annotations accordingly. For this task, we make use of a RoBERTa model for text classification, due to its high performance in NLP. We develop several language model-based baselines and present the results of our persuasive strategy label predictions as well as the improvements these intermediate labels make in detecting misinformation and producing interpretable results.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Recent advancements in language models have led to significant improvements in mathematical reasoning across various benchmarks. However, most of these benchmarks rely on automatic evaluation methods that only compare final answers using heuristics, without verifying the underlying reasoning steps. This limitation results in false positive solutions, where models may produce correct final answers but with flawed deduction paths. In this paper, we systematically examine the prevalence of false positive solutions in mathematical problem solving for language models. We analyze the characteristics and extent of this issue across different open-source models, datasets of varying difficulty levels, and decoding strategies. Specifically, we explore how false positives influence the inference time scaling behavior of language models. Our experimental results reveal that: (1) false positive solutions persist across different models, datasets, and decoding methods, (2) sampling-based inference time scaling methods do not alleviate the problem, and (3) the pass@N evaluation metric is more susceptible to false positives, suggesting a significantly lower scaling ceiling than what automatic evaluations indicate. Additionally, we analyze specific instances of false positives and discuss potential limitations in self-improvement techniques and synthetic data generation under such conditions. Our data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Wloner0809/False-Positives-in-Math.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Seeking health-related advice on the internet has become a common practice in the digital era. Determining the trustworthiness of medical claims found online and finding appropriate evidence for this information is increasingly challenging. Fact-checking has emerged as an approach to assess the veracity of factual claims using evidence from credible knowledge sources. To help advance the automation of this task, in this paper, we introduce a novel dataset of 750 health-related claims, labeled for veracity by medical experts and backed with evidence from appropriate clinical studies. We provide an analysis of the dataset, highlighting its characteristics and challenges. The dataset can be used for Machine Learning tasks related to automated fact-checking such as evidence retrieval, veracity prediction, and explanation generation. For this purpose, we provide baseline models based on different approaches, examine their performance, and discuss the findings.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

In this paper we introduce a new publicly available dataset for verification against textual sources, FEVER: Fact Extraction and VERification. It consists of 185,445 claims generated by altering sentences extracted from Wikipedia and subsequently verified without knowledge of the sentence they were derived from. The claims are classified as Supported, Refuted or NotEnoughInfo by annotators achieving 0.6841 in Fleiss kappa. For the first two classes, the annotators also recorded the sentence(s) forming the necessary evidence for their judgment. To characterize the challenge of the dataset presented, we develop a pipeline approach and compare it to suitably designed oracles. The best accuracy we achieve on labeling a claim accompanied by the correct evidence is 31.87%, while if we ignore the evidence we achieve 50.91%. Thus we believe that FEVER is a challenging testbed that will help stimulate progress on claim verification against textual sources.

Misinformation and disinformation demand fact checking that goes beyond simple evidence-based reasoning. Existing benchmarks fall short: they are largely single modality (text-only), span short time horizons, use shallow evidence, cover domains unevenly, and often omit full articles -- obscuring models' real-world capability. We present MMM-Fact, a large-scale benchmark of 125,449 fact-checked statements (1995--2025) across multiple domains, each paired with the full fact-check article and multimodal evidence (text, images, videos, tables) from four fact-checking sites and one news outlet. To reflect verification effort, each statement is tagged with a retrieval-difficulty tier -- Basic (1--5 sources), Intermediate (6--10), and Advanced (>10) -- supporting fairness-aware evaluation for multi-step, cross-modal reasoning. The dataset adopts a three-class veracity scheme (true/false/not enough information) and enables tasks in veracity prediction, explainable fact-checking, complex evidence aggregation, and longitudinal analysis. Baselines with mainstream LLMs show MMM-Fact is markedly harder than prior resources, with performance degrading as evidence complexity rises. MMM-Fact offers a realistic, scalable benchmark for transparent, reliable, multimodal fact-checking.

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

AI agents can now carry out data-driven scientific analyses end to end, and benchmarks assess them by giving an agent a question and a dataset and scoring its final answer against a fixed key. These benchmarks assume that a correct answer was derived from the supplied data, a property we call evidence grounding. However, an agent can also reach the key from prior knowledge or by ruling out the other options, and a score based on a single run cannot tell these cases apart. We show how to test this assumption and find that it often fails. For each question, we build versions of its data files in which the evidence for the answer is left intact, withdrawn or reversed, check each edit with a pre-registered reference statistic, and run the same agent on every version. We then measure evidence-grounded accuracy, which credits a correct answer only if the agent also responds when the evidence is withdrawn and follows it when it is reversed. We evaluate three agent scaffolds and five models on 18 single-cell questions from BAISBench and four synthetic problems from GeneBench-Pro. On the single-cell questions, the Claude agents are 95% accurate and answer 83% correctly without any data, but their evidence-grounded accuracy is only 41%. Hiding gene names raises the share of runs that follow reversed evidence from 58% to 93% on ten gene tasks, suggesting that prior knowledge competes with the supplied data. The benchmark score and LLM judges can also reward answers that ignore the changed evidence. Measuring scientific intelligence rather than recall therefore requires checking whether answers follow the evidence and whether scores reward them for it.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Information seeking users often pose questions with false presuppositions, especially when asking about unfamiliar topics. Most existing question answering (QA) datasets, in contrast, assume all questions have well defined answers. We introduce CREPE, a QA dataset containing a natural distribution of presupposition failures from online information-seeking forums. We find that 25% of questions contain false presuppositions, and provide annotations for these presuppositions and their corrections. Through extensive baseline experiments, we show that adaptations of existing open-domain QA models can find presuppositions moderately well, but struggle when predicting whether a presupposition is factually correct. This is in large part due to difficulty in retrieving relevant evidence passages from a large text corpus. CREPE provides a benchmark to study question answering in the wild, and our analyses provide avenues for future work in better modeling and further studying the task.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence. However, fallacious arguments are common, and some exacerbate problems such as spreading misinformation about climate change. In this paper, we propose the task of logical fallacy detection, and provide a new dataset (Logic) of logical fallacies generally found in text, together with an additional challenge set for detecting logical fallacies in climate change claims (LogicClimate). Detecting logical fallacies is a hard problem as the model must understand the underlying logical structure of the argument. We find that existing pretrained large language models perform poorly on this task. In contrast, we show that a simple structure-aware classifier outperforms the best language model by 5.46% on Logic and 4.51% on LogicClimate. We encourage future work to explore this task as (a) it can serve as a new reasoning challenge for language models, and (b) it can have potential applications in tackling the spread of misinformation. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/logical-fallacy

Hoaxes are a recognised form of disinformation created deliberately, with potential serious implications in the credibility of reference knowledge resources such as Wikipedia. What makes detecting Wikipedia hoaxes hard is that they often are written according to the official style guidelines. In this work, we first provide a systematic analysis of the similarities and discrepancies between legitimate and hoax Wikipedia articles, and introduce Hoaxpedia, a collection of 311 Hoax articles (from existing literature as well as official Wikipedia lists) alongside semantically similar real articles. We report results of binary classification experiments in the task of predicting whether a Wikipedia article is real or hoax, and analyze several settings as well as a range of language models. Our results suggest that detecting deceitful content in Wikipedia based on content alone, despite not having been explored much in the past, is a promising direction.

Existing techniques for training language models can be misaligned with the truth: if we train models with imitation learning, they may reproduce errors that humans make; if we train them to generate text that humans rate highly, they may output errors that human evaluators can't detect. We propose circumventing this issue by directly finding latent knowledge inside the internal activations of a language model in a purely unsupervised way. Specifically, we introduce a method for accurately answering yes-no questions given only unlabeled model activations. It works by finding a direction in activation space that satisfies logical consistency properties, such as that a statement and its negation have opposite truth values. We show that despite using no supervision and no model outputs, our method can recover diverse knowledge represented in large language models: across 6 models and 10 question-answering datasets, it outperforms zero-shot accuracy by 4\% on average. We also find that it cuts prompt sensitivity in half and continues to maintain high accuracy even when models are prompted to generate incorrect answers. Our results provide an initial step toward discovering what language models know, distinct from what they say, even when we don't have access to explicit ground truth labels.

Logical fallacies are common in public communication and can mislead audiences; fallacious arguments may still appear convincing despite lacking soundness, because convincingness is inherently subjective. We present the first computational study of how emotional framing interacts with fallacies and convincingness, using large language models (LLMs) to systematically change emotional appeals in fallacious arguments. We benchmark eight LLMs on injecting emotional appeal into fallacious arguments while preserving their logical structures, then use the best models to generate stimuli for a human study. Our results show that LLM-driven emotional framing reduces human fallacy detection in F1 by 14.5% on average. Humans perform better in fallacy detection when perceiving enjoyment than fear or sadness, and these three emotions also correlate with significantly higher convincingness compared to neutral or other emotion states. Our work has implications for AI-driven emotional manipulation in the context of fallacious argumentation.

Although much research has focused on AI explanations to support decisions in complex information-seeking tasks such as fact-checking, the role of evidence is surprisingly under-researched. In our study, we systematically varied explanation type, AI prediction certainty, and correctness of AI system advice for non-expert participants, who evaluated the veracity of claims and AI system predictions. Participants were provided the option of easily inspecting the underlying evidence. We found that participants consistently relied on evidence to validate AI claims across all experimental conditions. When participants were presented with natural language explanations, evidence was used less frequently although they relied on it when these explanations seemed insufficient or flawed. Qualitative data suggests that participants attempted to infer evidence source reliability, despite source identities being deliberately omitted. Our results demonstrate that evidence is a key ingredient in how people evaluate the reliability of information presented by an AI system and, in combination with natural language explanations, offers valuable support for decision-making. Further research is urgently needed to understand how evidence ought to be presented and how people engage with it in practice.

AI systems rewrite information constantly: conversations become stored memories, documents become answers. The rewrite can keep a claim while washing away what made it checkable, who said it, how sure they were, when it held. We call that failure factwashing, and release factwash, an open-source write-time gate that catches it deterministically, with named flags and evidence rather than an LLM judge. Building it answers a practical question: when does a cheap check suffice, and when do you need a model? What decides is whether the property has a bounded surface-cue inventory. Explicit negation cues are close to enumerable, so a word list finishes and transfers, reaching 0.91 F1 on untuned text. Hedging and attribution have open-ended realizations, so vocabulary plateaus near half recall, and a one-question LLM witness recovers +17 and +15 points of cue-detection recall at equal precision. Deployed, that witness may only lower a verdict, so it buys precision rather than coverage. We measure cue detection on 105,596 independently annotated sentences. A blind-labelled corpus of memory writes then locates the failure: 55% of bad writes in conversational hearsay, 7% in business email (p < 0.001), so the first deployment question is not which detector to use but whether the failure occurs at all. On unmodified mem0 2.0.7, the gate flags 5 of 8 hedged-hearsay writes.

Existing metrics for factuality and faithfulness evaluate whether an answer is supported or contradicted by its grounding documents, but they fail to capture when both supporting and contradicting evidence coexist. We introduce ConflictScore, a novel metric that quantifies how well a model's response acknowledges conflicting evidence in its grounding documents. Our framework decomposes responses into atomic claims, labels each claim against each grounding document, and then aggregates these labels into two complementary measures: ConflictScore-Count (CS-C), the proportion of claims exhibiting conflicts, and ConflictScore-Ratio (CS-R), the balance between supporting and contradicting evidence. We develop ConflictBench, a benchmark covering diverse forms of conflicts such as ambiguity, contradiction, and divergent opinions, to systematically evaluate our metric. Experiments show that ConflictScore effectively detects overconfident claims across domains and can serve as a corrective feedback mechanism that improves truthfulness on TruthfulQA.

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has facilitated numerous benefits. However, hallucination is a significant concern. In response, Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a highly promising paradigm to improve LLM outputs by grounding them in factual information. RAG relies on textual entailment (TE) or similar methods to check if the text produced by LLMs is supported or contradicted, compared to retrieved documents. This paper argues that conventional TE methods are inadequate for spotting hallucinations in content generated by LLMs. For instance, consider a prompt about the 'USA's stance on the Ukraine war''. The AI-generated text states, ...U.S. President Barack Obama says the U.S. will not put troops in Ukraine...'' However, during the war the U.S. president is Joe Biden which contradicts factual reality. Moreover, current TE systems are unable to accurately annotate the given text and identify the exact portion that is contradicted. To address this, we introduces a new type of TE called ``Factual Entailment (FE).'', aims to detect factual inaccuracies in content generated by LLMs while also highlighting the specific text segment that contradicts reality. We present FACTOID (FACTual enTAILment for hallucInation Detection), a benchmark dataset for FE. We propose a multi-task learning (MTL) framework for FE, incorporating state-of-the-art (SoTA) long text embeddings such as e5-mistral-7b-instruct, along with GPT-3, SpanBERT, and RoFormer. The proposed MTL architecture for FE achieves an avg. 40\% improvement in accuracy on the FACTOID benchmark compared to SoTA TE methods. As FE automatically detects hallucinations, we assessed 15 modern LLMs and ranked them using our proposed Auto Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI_auto). This index quantifies and offers a comparative scale to evaluate and rank LLMs according to their hallucinations.

In the last year or so and going back many decades there has been extensive claims by major computational scientists, engineers, and others that AGI, artificial general intelligence, is five or ten years away, but without a scintilla of scientific evidence, for a broad body of these claims. Computers will become conscious, have a theory of mind, think and reason, will become more intelligent than humans, and so on. But the claims are science fiction, not science. This article reviews evidence for the following three propositions using extensive body of scientific research and related sources from the cognitive and neurosciences, evolutionary evidence, linguistics, data science, comparative psychology, self-driving cars, robotics. and the learning sciences. (1) Do computing machines think or reason? (2) Are computing machines sentient or conscious? (3) Do computing machines have a theory of mind?

The internet gives the world an open platform to express their views and share their stories. While this is very valuable, it makes fake news one of our society's most pressing problems. Manual fact checking process is time consuming, which makes it challenging to disprove misleading assertions before they cause significant harm. This is he driving interest in automatic fact or claim verification. Some of the existing datasets aim to support development of automating fact-checking techniques, however, most of them are text based. Multi-modal fact verification has received relatively scant attention. In this paper, we provide a multi-modal fact-checking dataset called FACTIFY 2, improving Factify 1 by using new data sources and adding satire articles. Factify 2 has 50,000 new data instances. Similar to FACTIFY 1.0, we have three broad categories - support, no-evidence, and refute, with sub-categories based on the entailment of visual and textual data. We also provide a BERT and Vison Transformer based baseline, which achieves 65% F1 score in the test set. The baseline codes and the dataset will be made available at https://github.com/surya1701/Factify-2.0.

An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to `wrong moves' in a discussion. Despite their importance, argumentation scholars and NLP researchers with focus on argumentation quality have not yet investigated fallacies empirically. The nonexistence of resources dealing with fallacious argumentation calls for scalable approaches to data acquisition and annotation, for which the serious games methodology offers an appealing, yet unexplored, alternative. We present Argotario, a serious game that deals with fallacies in everyday argumentation. Argotario is a multilingual, open-source, platform-independent application with strong educational aspects, accessible at www.argotario.net.

In an age characterized by the proliferation of mis- and disinformation online, it is critical to empower readers to understand the content they are reading. Important efforts in this direction rely on manual or automatic fact-checking, which can be challenging for emerging claims with limited information. Such scenarios can be handled by assessing the reliability and the political bias of the source of the claim, i.e., characterizing entire news outlets rather than individual claims or articles. This is an important but understudied research direction. While prior work has looked into linguistic and social contexts, we do not analyze individual articles or information in social media. Instead, we propose a novel methodology that emulates the criteria that professional fact-checkers use to assess the factuality and political bias of an entire outlet. Specifically, we design a variety of prompts based on these criteria and elicit responses from large language models (LLMs), which we aggregate to make predictions. In addition to demonstrating sizable improvements over strong baselines via extensive experiments with multiple LLMs, we provide an in-depth error analysis of the effect of media popularity and region on model performance. Further, we conduct an ablation study to highlight the key components of our dataset that contribute to these improvements. To facilitate future research, we released our dataset and code at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/llm-media-profiling.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

Whether large language models can be prompted to generate rhetorical fallacies on demand, and whether current safety post-training constrains this behavior, has received less attention than the related question of detecting fallacies in existing text. We close this gap with DeflectBench, evaluating 23,990 generations from four frontier models across three deflection strategies (whataboutism, ad hominem, red herring), seven prompt framings, and 80 claims spanning four controversy levels. Refusal is governed primarily by request structure rather than claim content. Per claim refusal varies by only 11 percentage points across the 80 claims, while a single prompt frame change can swing within model refusal by nearly 100 percentage points and switching the requested fallacy type can swing it by over 80 percentage points within explicit framings. An educational debate coach prompt framing collapses refusal to near zero across all four model families, but the bypassed behavior is not clean compliance. Models typically produce labeled compliance, naming the requested manipulation in the same response that contains it. The four models distribute differently across refusal, labeled compliance, soft refusal, and clean compliance. The code and dataset are released at https://github.com/ArtKanke/DeflectBench.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.